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!e spectacular growth of the Occupy Movement re"ects a deep-seated political 
sentiment. !e movement has grown, in just a little over two months, from an 
occupation of about 200 people in Zuccotti Park in New York City to a movement that 
is now represented in over 2,400 cities (according to Occupy Together) and in other 
formats such as Occupy Colleges and Occupy the Media. Many local communities— 
Riverside, San Bernardino, and Redlands among them—have been the sites of Occupy 
encampments and/or events. 
What’s more, in polls taken by Public Policy Polling, the fraction of voters who 
support the movement stands at about 33% (http://www.publicpolicypolling.
com/main/2011/11/voters-moving-against-occupy-movement.html). Given the 
traditionally conservative nature of the U.S. electorate, this is a strong sentiment. !e 
Civil Rights movement, for example, did not have this level of support in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, and it took years before the Anti-War Movement of the 1960s reached 
the level of approval currently given to the Occupiers (http://www.publicpolicypolling.
com/main/2011/11/voters-moving-against-occupy-movement.html). Clearly, 
something is happening here.
To political economists, what makes this phenomenon interesting is that it represents 
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Continued from page 1
Staying Informed about CSUSB Department of 
Economics Events and News
If you’re receiving the Coyote Economist, then you’re on our mailing list and everything is as it should be. But, if you know 
of an Economics Major, or an Econ Fellow Traveler, who is not receiving the Coyote Economist through email, then please 
have him/her inform our Administrative Support Coordinator, Ms. Jacqueline Carrillo, or the Chair of the Economics 
Department, Professor Mayo Toruño. Our phone number is 909-537-5511. 
 You can stay informed by consulting:
 Our Website - http://economics.csusb.edu/
 Our Facebook Page- http://www.facebook.com/pages/CSUSB-Department-of-Economics/109500729082841
 Chair of the Economics Department – mtoruno@csusb.edu
continued on page 3
an attitude that runs against what 
many claim are the dominant 
mainstream values in this county. 
Unlike the Tea Party, which gives 
voice to these dominant values, the 
Occupy Movement is giving voice to a 
contrarian set of norms. 
While the Tea Party emphasizes 
private property, individualism, free 
markets, and a deep suspicion of 
government and “socialist” solutions, 
the Occupy Movement questions 
the power of corporations and is 
comfortable with socializing health 
care and education, redistributing 
income, and regulating markets—
speci#cally #nancial markets. 
However, while their encampments 
emphasize horizontalism, consensus 
decision-making, and an anarcho-
socialist perspective, the Occupy 
movement is not seeking the 
overthrow of capitalism. Instead, it 
appears to seek a more fair form of 
capitalism. One gets the sense that 
they would prefer the kind of social 
democracies found in the Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland), where the 
underlying institutions of private 
...the elite have managed to 
change the legal, economic, 
and social rules of the game..
property and markets are regulated 
to bring about greater equity and 
a broader access to public services 
than is common in the United States.
!e Occupy Movement’s simple 
but powerful slogan, “We are the 
99%,” has captured the imagination of 
a portion of the public that perceives 
that public policy in this country is 
being driven by a wealthy elite that 
ignores or shuts out the voice of 
the vast majority of citizens. !e 
government, many in the Occupy 
Movement claim, has been captured 
by corporations and wealthy elites, 
making it less of a democracy and 
more of a “corporatocracy”: rule 
by large corporations and by those 
who bene#t from the ownership and 
control of these corporations. 
One consequence of this capture 
of the government has been that the 
elite have managed to change the legal, 
economic, and social rules of the game 
so that they, the elite, bene#t even more 
than before. !is, in turn, has further 
enhanced the economic and political 
power of the elite and these elites have 
used this enhanced power to further 
tilt the rules of the game even more in 
their favor. A growing inequality in the 
distribution of wealth and income is 
one manifestation of this.
Political economists have long 
drawn attention to the way elites and 
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“!ere would not have been a 
tea party without Fox.”
the business sector shape government. 
For instance, both !orstein Veblen 
and Karl Marx argued that, in 
capitalist societies, government largely 
re"ects the in"uence and power of 
the business class. While the system 
is formally democratic and allows 
workers, the overwhelming majority 
of the electorate, to participate in the 
choice of legislators and executives, 
it is nevertheless the case that elected 
o$cials must be keenly attentive to the 
needs of business. 
For instance, if elected o$cials 
ignore business interests they might 
provoke a “capital strike”—in which 
businesses reduce investment and 
production—which threatens the 
ouster of o%ending politicians as the 
public blames the politicians for the 
poor economic conditions created by 
the capital strike.
Beyond this, huge corporations 
and rich elites are able to shape public 
discourse in this country in ways that 
bene#t these huge corporations and 
the elites. Consumers of this shaped 
public discourse—o&en middle-
class workers—come to believe that 
their own (middle-class and worker) 
interests are aligned with the interests 
of corporations and 
the elite. Out of this we got the Tea 
Party, which has provided cover for 
some in Congress to claim that policies 
Congress passes (designed to bene#t 
large corporations and elites) are 
actually the product of the democratic 
demands of a grassroots and middle-
class public movement. Yet the Tea 
Party’s rise to public prominence was 
not due to grassroots support. As a 
Tea Party leader Sal Russo admitted 
in a May 22, 2011 New York Magazine 
article, “!ere would not have been a 
tea party without Fox.”
!e current political and 
economic structure of the United 
States is something new, but is also a 
manifestation of long-run tendencies. 
For instance, Paul Baran and 
Paul Sweezy, in their 1966 book 
Monopoly Capital, argued that the 
rise of the corporate form of business 
led to a structural transformation 
of capitalism, from the competitive 
capital form of the 19th century to 
the monopoly capital form starting in 
the 20th century. Monopoly capital 
economies are dominated by giant 
corporations that control a majority 
of the manufacturing and #nancial 
assets, and operate in oligopolistic 
and/or monopolistic markets. Baran 
and Sweezy argued that this form of 
capitalism tended to generate pro#ts 
that were so high that the system had 
di$culty #nding ways to pro#tably 
reinvest the 
pro#t. !is situation, they argued, 
produced both stagnation in the 
economy and the potential for growing 
income for those at the top (and a 
consequent greater inequality in 
income and wealth distribution). 
In a related vein, John Kenneth 
Galbraith argued in !e New 
Industrial State that the rise of the 
giant corporation also has important 
cultural and political e%ects, creating 
an ideological environment in which 
consumer and political choices 
largely re"ect the interests of giant 
corporations.
In short, the Occupy Movement 
has correctly assessed the broad 
outlines of what has been taking place 
for quite some time: growing wealth 
and income inequality and growing 
in"uence by the corporate elite.
Rising Income and Wealth Inequality
!e distribution of income and wealth 
is more unequal now than it was in the 
1970s. Consider #rst the distribution 
of income. 
A recent Congressional Budget 
O$ce (CBO) studied change in the 
distribution of household income 
between 1979 and 2007 (CBO, “Trends 
in the Distribution of Household 
Income Between 1979 and 2007,” 
October 2011). !e study looked at 
income (from both labor and property 
ownership) from two di%erent 
perspectives: #rst, in terms of income 
before taxes and transfers; and second, 
in terms of income a&er taxes and 
transfers. !e #rst measure captures 
the level of income distribution 
generated by “market forces” while 
the second measure captures the 
...the Occupy Movement has 
correctly assessed the broad 
outlines of what has been 
taking place for quite some 
time... 
continued on page 4
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level of income distribution generated 
by the combination of market forces 
and particular public policies (i.e., taxes 
and transfers). As a result, the latter 
measure provides a better picture of the 
role of public policy (i.e. neoliberalism) 
in the distribution of income.
!e chart below, taken from the 
CBO study, shows changes in the 
distribution of income a&er taxes and 
transfers for income quintiles from 
1979 to 2007. Each income quartile 
includes 20% of households. !e lowest 
quintile includes the 20% of households 
with the lowest a&er-tax income, the 
second-lowest quintile includes the 
20% of households who have a&er-
tax income above the lowest quintile 
but below those in the quintiles above 
them, and so on. 
!e chart shows, for instance, that 
in 1979 the a&er-tax income of the 
lowest quintile (which includes the 
20% of US households who have the 
lowest income) made up about 8% of 
the total household incomes in that 
year. !e next bar to the right indicates 
that in 2007 the lowest quintile’s share 
of a&er-tax income had fallen to about 
6% of all a&er-tax income earned in 
that year. Market and political forces 
operating over 1979 to 2007 led 
to a shi& in income away from the 
households in the lowest quintile.
!e chart also shows that between 
1979 and 2007 market and political 
forces caused a shi& in a&er-tax  
income toward the richest quintile. 
Between these years, the richest 
quintile saw their share of the nation’s 
income grow from 43% to 53%. All 
other quintiles saw their share of 
income fall over the same period.
Yet, a closer look at the chart 
reveals that the gain to the upper 
quintile was not shared by all within 
that quintile. !e chart indicates an 
important fact:  the growth in a&er-tax 
income for the upper quintile was due 
exclusively to shi&s toward the top 1% 
of all households. Over 1979 to 2007, 
then, households in the lower 99% saw 
their share of the nation’s income fall 
while households in the upper 1% saw 
dramatic increases in their share of the 
nation’s income.
!e focus on the 1% by the Occupy 
Movement seems well-supported by 
this data. !e political and economic 
force operating within the U.S. granted 
great bene#ts for the upper 1%. 
Certainly some of the other 99% are 
doing okay #nancially, but many are 
falling behind as their incomes have 
failed to keep up. And the current bad 
economic conditions have seen many 
in the lower 99% face grave challenges 
as they have struggled in the face of 
layo%s and the lack of appropriate jobs 
for their education, skills, and abilities. 
!e change in the distribution of 
wealth follows a similar pattern as 
seen above for income. !e broadest 
measure of wealth is net worth, which 
is equal to: value of assets owned 
minus the value of debt. !is measure 
of net worth includes all assets: both 
tangible assets (e.g., land, businesses 
and homes) and #nancial assets (such 
as savings accounts, stocks and bonds) 
...households in the upper 1% 
saw dramatic increases in their 
share of the nation’s income.
Source: Congressional Budget O$ce, “Trends in the Distribution of Household Income Between 1979 and 2007,” October 2011, p. XIII.
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5as well as consumptive (such as a car 
or a home) or productive (such as a 
farm or factory) assets. Debt includes 
all forms of debt, such as credit card 
debt, mortgages, and other forms of 
loan liabilities.
!e chart above, based on a recent 
study by Edward Wol%, shows the 
distribution net worth in two years, 
1983 and 2007. 
Notice that between these two 
years, the top 5% of all households 
(the upper red bar) saw their share 
of net worth grow from 56% to 62%. 
Over the same period, the rest of the 
country (the other 95%) saw their 
share of net wealth decline from 44% 
to 38%, which represents a decline of 
13% in their share of net wealth. 
It’s important to remember that 
this measure of net worth includes 
all assets and liabilities and does not 
distinguish between consumptive 
and productive assets. If we subtract 
from this measure the portion of net 
worth tied to the ownership of the 
primary residence (the overwhelming 
contributor to net worth for the 
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bottom 80% of all households) then 
the inequity in the distribution of net 
worth is even more dramatic.
In recent decades, the US economic 
and political system has generated a 
worsening distribution of both income 
and wealth. !ose at the top have 
managed to grab a larger portion of the 
income generated within the United 
States and, in parallel, have managed to 
take hold of a larger portion of wealth 
that exists within the United States. 
!ese changes have occurred slowly, 
and have been the consequence of a 
large number of small changes in the 
US economy and the political and 
social system within the country. 
!ese changes, however, did not 
become a centerpiece of protest until 
the #nancial system (which played 
a part in the worsening distribution 
and wealth) failed in the face of a lack 
of government regulation of this 
increasingly unrestrained #nancial 
We’re on 
Facebook !!
Don’t forget to check us out on 
Facebook and say that you like us! 
You can #nd the Economics 
Department at !e CSUSB Department 
of Economics Facebook page.  
Joining us on Facebook is an 
important way of keeping up with 
Departmental news and Department 
events as well as getting information 
on political economy. Look for us on 
Facebook...we’re easy to #nd!
system. !e consequent high levels of 
unemployment—and the failure of the 
Congress and the President to pursue 
the obvious demand-management 
remedies to this problem—have 
created a large number of people 
within the US who are willing to stand 
up and point out the obvious: the US 
economic and political system has 
been captured by the upper 1%…and 
the lower 99% are paying the price.
...the US economic and political 
system seems to have been 
captured by the upper 1%...
Continued from page 4
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Course Section Title   Time   Days Instructor  
104 01 ECON SOCIAL ISSUES 1200-0110 PM MWF ROSE
200 01 PRIN MICROECON 0920-1030 AM MWF STAFF
200 02 PRIN MICROECON 1200-0150 PM MW STAFF
200 03 PRIN MICROECON 0400-0550 PM MW ASHEGHIAN
200 04 PRIN MICROECON 1000-1150 AM TR STAFF
200 05 PRIN MICROECON 0200-0350 PM TR STAFF
200 06 PRIN MICROECON 0600-0750 PM TR STAFF
202 01 PRIN MACROECON 1040-1150 AM MWF STAFF
202 02 PRIN MACROECON 0600-0750 PM MW KONYAR
202 03 PRIN MACROECON 1000-1150 AM TR STAFF
202 04 PRIN MACROECON 0200-0350 PM TR STAFF
202 05 PRIN MACROECON 0600-07:50 PM TR NILSSON
311 01 ECON K-8  1200-0150 PM TR CHARKINS
333 01 PE OF WOMEN 1040-1150 AM MWF ROSE
335 01 TOOLS EC ANALYSIS 0240-0350 PM MWF HARRIS
357 01 PE OF LGBT  0120-02:30 PM MWF ROSE
372 01 BUSINESS CYCLES 0200-0350 PM TR HARRIS
410 01 MONEY & BANKING 0600-0750 PM TR STAFF
445 01 POL ECONOMY 0400-0550 PM TR NILSSON
450 01 GLOBAL ECONOMY 0600-0750 PM MW ASHEGHIAN
490 01 ECONOMETRICS 0400-0550 PM MW KONYAR
500 01 HIST ECON IDEAS 1200-0110 PM MWF TORUNO
630 01 INT ECON ISSUES 0600-0950 PM W DULGEROFF
